Two frontiers in rural management: agricultural extension and managing the exploitation of communal natural resources by Chambers, Robert
I N S T I T U T E OF DEVELOPMENT S T U D I E S AT T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F S U S S E X , BRIGHTON. E N G L A N D 
c 
Robert Chambers 
Two Frontiers in Rural Management: 
Agricultural Extensión and Managing 
the Exploitation of Communal Natural Resources 
DS C O N M O m i 113 
IDS G O i M I i m i H 113 
I S l i M i i a i l 113 
T w o Frontiers in Rural M a n a g e m e n t : Agricultural Extens ión a n d Manag ing the 
Explo i tat ion of Communal Natural Resources 
by Robert Charnbers* 
Introduction 
It is odd that we talk of farm 'management, ' water 
'management, ' and the 'management ' of natural 
resources, all referring to tlúrígs, but of rural and 
agricultural 'administra ti when we refer to 
people. Quibbles over the actual or desirable 
meanings of words are of ten not frui tful . But the 
fact is that our attitudes are influenced by the 
connotations and associations of words and that, 
in this case, those of 'management ' are generally 
more active, positive, opportunity-seeking, aggres-
sive, developmental and change-oriented; whereas 
those of 'administration' are more passive, nega-
tive, unenterprising, static and status quo-oriented. 
The physical and biological scientists have appro-
priated 'management ' for the manipulation and 
control of the physical and organic environment, 
while social scientists and others appear generally 
content to be left with 'administration' to describe 
the handling and control of people in rural organ-
izations and communities. These usages are so well 
established that I shall no t kick against the pricks 
by challenging them. But we may start by noticing 
that they are linked with omissions in research, in 
official attitudes and concerns, and in the at tent ion 
of would-be reformers. Use of 'management ' for 
farms, water and resources and of 'administration' 
for people has obscured the potential of a manage-
ment approach to people, especially people in 
organizations. In particular there has been: 
(a) a failure to approach the opportunities and 
problems of agricultural extensión as oppor-
tunities and problems of management — that is, 
of managing extensión agents, for which the 
techniques and insights of management theory 
and practice can be used; 
(b) a failure to see that the opportunities and 
problems of managing communal natural re-
sources involve a dimensión of human manage-
ment — that is, of the management of men in 
organizations and in communities. 
These failures have not, of course, been absolute; 
rather they have been widespread tendencies. The 
main theme of this paper is that whatever other 
*Rober t Charnbers ¡s a Fellow of the Inst i tute of Development 
Studies. 
priorities in rural and agricultural administration 
there may be, these two should be considered for 
placing high on the list. And their previous neglect 
makes them, a little surprisingly, frontiers for 
exploration and experiment. 
The argument could spread very widely. For the 
purposes of this paper I shall confine it largely to 
the management of agricultural extensión and the 
management of those who manage communal 
natural resources. This is partly because these are 
functions of so many governments and may indeed 
of ten be unavoidable responsibilities for govern-
ments. There is scope for much argument about 
the extent to which other services such as credit, 
input supply and marketing should be provided by 
government or para-statal organizations, or through 
various controlled or laissez-faire approaches 
making use of the prívate sector. But there is much 
less room for argument about agricultural exten-
sión (including its research aspects) which in prac-
tice is always a funct ion in part performed by 
direct government intervention; or about the 
management of communal resources (water, 
forests, fisheries, soil, wildlife, grazing) which in 
practice is very often a responsibility assumed by 
governments. Those who provide inputs or market-
ing may of ten, perhaps increasingly, be managed in 
organizations with a business management orienta-
tion. Those who provide agricultural research and 
extensión and who manage communal resources 
are likely, if the evidence of the past can be 
projected, to remain as government staff in govern-
ment organizations. 
The evidence is drawn f rom a mixture of personal 
experience and secondary sources, both deriving 
f rom Eastern Africa and South Asia. The descrip-
tion and assertions do not apply to these regions in 
their entirety, and may not always apply outside 
them; I believe them nevertheless to be generally 
true, and I should be surprised if the conclusions 
do not apply widely. If it can be shown that there 
are places where they do not apply, then those 
places may be high priority for research, so that 
the benefits of the lessons learnt there and the 
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Three red herrings 
In considering the management of agricultural 
extensión and the management of those who 
manage communal resources, there are three sup-
posed paths to improvement which are broad, 
plausible and misleading. They are so commonly 
advocated and yet o f t en of such doubt fu l valué 
that they are wor th sett ing out . 
The first is stating that there is a need for more (or 
better) co-ordination. This word 'co-ordination' is 
an admirable means of evading clear and detailed 
thought and prescription. It is a strong favourite 
among consultants writing their reports under pres-
sure of t ime. It comes to the surface of one's mind 
very readily whenever a detailed organizational or 
procedural detail comes up for decisión and can be 
used to avoid facing the issue, whatever it is. It 
glosses over awkward unknowns. It can be used, as 
in India, whenever complex problems drive the 
observer to despair. In one repor t 'co-ordination' 
and its homologues appeared once in roughly 220 
words (FAC 1970). It is used sometimes as an 
evasive synonym for ' au thor i ty ' and 'power. ' A cali 
for more or be t te r co-ordination may really mean a 
cali for more or greater au thor i ty and power for 
whoever is to be the co-ordinator. Further , it is 
o f ten accepted as so unquest ionably good tha t 
more of it is always desirable, and máximum 
co-ordination is best of all. Thua, another repor t : 
'Within the executive organization there needs to 
be the máximum co-ordination between irrigation 
engineering, agricultural development and land 
set t lement at all levels' (UNDP/FAO 1969:17) . 
But a little reflection shows that co-ordination 
consists of communica t ion — through meetings, 
through visits, through writing. If these were maxi-
mized, then ou tpu t would be minimized. It is 
optimal, not máximum, co-ordination that is re-
quired. But the wisest conclusión is perhaps that it 
is the use of the word itself tha t should be 
minimized, and more precise expressions used 
wherever reasonable. The writer or speaker would 
then be forced into confront ing the reality of the 
procedures and relationships with which he is 
concerned and compelled to be more specific 
about them. 
The second red herring is ministerial reorganiza-
r o n . I t is far easier and o f t en more congenial for 
the visiting consultant or the sénior civil servant to 
meet officials in their offices in the capital city, 
than it is to dig in to the rural reality of the lower 
levels. It is far easier t o write a report suggesting 
the transfer of depar tment A to Ministry B, or the 
amalgamation of accounting in división C, or what-
ever on similar lines, than it is to conf ron t the 
problems of management at the lower and field 
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levels. Moreover, there is (supposedly, at least) 
more internationally available expertise in the 
former than the latter. But more than this, reorgan-
izations at a high level are o f ten very acceptable 
since p romot ion and increases in emoluments are 
common under such circumstances and demot ion 
or loss of salary rare. There have been good and 
useful reorganizations of Ministries, especially per-
haps of Ministries of Agriculture, and fur ther re-
organizations may o f t en be desirable. But they 
may no t be the highest priority, which may lie in 
less obvious, less easy, bu t more basic questions of 
management at the field level. 
The third red herring is the cali for more discipline 
and harder work. Of ten this is linked with the 
imposit ion of a system of targets set high up and 
t ransmit ted downwards with ominous threats and 
cajoling, a system which has been generally con-
demned (e.g. by Hunter , 1970). It implies a more 
authori tar ian and hierarchical organization and 
style of operat ion (for analyses see especially 
Heginbotham, 1973;Mook, 1974 ;and Moris, 1972). 
In the circumstances of many countries it is likely 
to be dysfunct ional through the evasión and false 
report ing which it generates. Part of its weakness is 
that it represents a reflex of frustrat ion. Discipline 
and hard work are called for at precisely the t ime 
when they are not for thcoming and the person 
calling for them does no t unders tand why. A more 
careful and sympathet ic analysis is required, one 
that will reveal the particular circumstances and 
needs of each managerial situation. 
A more careful direction for concern and a t tent ion 
emerges: instead of calis for more and bet ter 
co-ordination, detailed specification of procedures 
to p romote it; instead of reorganization at the 
ministerial level, management at the field level; 
instead of authori tar ian demands for more work, a 
humane understanding of the position of field 
staff. With these basic orientations, we can turn to 
an examinat ion of the management of agricultural 
extensión and of communal resources. 
Agricultural extensión — 
misperceptions and realism 
It is useful to begin by examining some perceptions 
of agricultural extensión and by trying to assess the 
reality which lies beyond them. There is a tensión 
here between two sets of evidence. On the one 
hand there is the rosy impression given by official 
statistics, by official visits t o the field, and by some 
quanti tat ive social science research. On the other 
hand there is the depressing picture compounded 
of the critical scepticism of sénior officials and of 
the findings of some case-study social science 
research. Let us consider these two sets of evidence 
and percept ion in turn. 
A rosy impression of the effectiveness of agricul-
tural extensión is o f ten given by official statistics 
for the achievement of targets when these targets 
are reported by those responsible for achieving 
them. Sometimes, as in Tamil Nadu (India), this 
has provoked a periodic scaling down of statistics 
to compénsate for widespread over-reporting. The 
impression is, however, sust 'ñned by the way in 
which visits by sénior officials are organized by 
júnior officials all the way down the line. What the 
sénior official is shown is almost invariably the 
better-served and more progressive villages, and the 
more progressive farmers within those villages. 
Frequently too these visits have an urban bias, with 
exposure only to that which is cióse to and easily 
accessible to an urban centre, a good rest house or 
hotel, and a main road. 
That some quantitive social science research should 
support these impressions is a little surprising. But 
sometimes survey researchers follow the guidance 
of officials in the selection of what to study, 
reinforcing urban and progressive biases. The objec-
tives of s tudy may be limited to 'progressiveness' 
rather than backwardness, to adopt ion rather than 
reasons for non-adoption, to ident ifying the 
characteristics of an area where an innovation has 
spread rather than those of an area where it has no t 
spread. The very heavy concentra t ion of research 
in ÍADP districts in India (Harriss, 1974) is a case 
in point. Moreover, statistical social survey tech-
niques, particularly when under taken with visible 
official support , are liable to elicit heavily exaggei--
ated responses f rom farmers when they are askecl 
about extensión contact (Charnbers and Wickre-
manayake, 1974) and whether they are satisfied 
with the services they receive. When the inter-
viewer has been brought to a farm interview by an 
extensión worker in a government vehicle, it is 
scarcely to be wondered at tha t the farmer says 
that he is regularly visited by the extensión worker 
and is satisfied with the services he receives. 
To some degree, too, a false impression of success-
ful extensión has been given by the fashion for 
extension educat ion research, which emphasizes 
the process of communicat ion rather than the 
valué of the message. Extensión is difficult to 
evalúate, bu t one of the easiest components to 
measure is communicat ion; and this has encour-
aged a tendency to s tudy extensión education 
rather than the more complex and difficult and, in 
my view, more impor tan t subject of the valué of 
the advice or technology offered to the farmer. All 
too of ten , bet ter communicat ions might be worse 
for the farmer because the advice itself is bad. In 
sum, evaluation of communicat ion is liable to two 
over-favourable biases: first, deferential or prudent 
responses f rom those interviewed; the second, f rom 
failure to notice bad messages, counting only 
whether the potential innovator has received the 
message. In both cases the ou tcome can be a 
misleading favourable impression of the effective-
ness of the extensión process as a whole. Finally, it 
is sad to have to admit tha t there is much diplo-
macy in the choice of topics and tools for social 
science research, abjuring those which would em-
barrassingly reveal corrupt ion and inefficiency and 
concentrat ing on those which conveniently avoid 
or filter out such discordant informat ion. In this 
respect, quanti tat ive survey research is con-
veniently aseptic and selective. 
In contrast , a depressing picture of agricultural 
extensión is coloured partly by the critical 
scepticism of sénior officials. They guess that the 
statistics of achievement are exaggerated, that they 
are shown only the best, that there is widespread 
corrupt ion and inefficiency, that things are no t as 
they are presented to them. But they are prevented 
by the hierarchical and official s tructure of their 
perceptions f rom seeing things as they really are; 
and knowing or suspecting this they may take 
refuge in exaggerating prívate cynicism to compén-
sate for the public optimism required by their 
roles. Their low assessment of agricultural exten-
sión does, however, receive support f rom the work 
of those social scientists who manage to penetra te 
through to what actually happens at the lowest 
levels of administration, of ten combining case 
studies with surveys. The work of Cliffe and others 
(1968) in Tanzania, Leonard (1970, 1971, 1972) 
in Kenya, Harrison (1969) in Nigeria and Hegin-
bo tham (1973) and Mook (1974) in India has 
uncovered variously a world of low hours of work, 
of lack of imagination, of service confined to the 
more influential farmers, of pe t ty corrupt ion, of 
work restriction, of false reporting, and of authori-
tarian management by sénior officials. Most obser-
vers can quote incidents and examples of such 
activities as the systematic falsification of diaries in 
order to claim máximum nights-out allowances, of 
inputs being supplied only to the richer and more 
influential, of corrupt ion and of abuse of júnior 
officials by their superiors. Unfor tunately , such 
studies of agricultural administration are rarely 
published; but their outrageous contents are read, 
remembered and regaled as stories, to the neglect 
of the evidence they also present of positive 
achievement, thus again reinforcing the negative 
and pessimistic view of performance of agricultural 
extensión. 
We can expect that neither the rosy ñor the 
depressing view is balanced. The t ru th can be 
sought somewhere between them. Case studies of 
individual extensión workers (for example, Dubey 
et al., 1962; Kothari , 1967) have gone out of 
fashion; but the bet ter of these studies were pro-
bably more useful sources for policy insights than 
the scholastic volumes on extensión educat ion and 
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the like which have followed them (and which 
leave one wonderirfg whether communicat ions 
specialists could not improve their own communi-
cation). For what case studies show is that exten-
sión workers are human beings behaving fairly 
rationally in the social, economic and work situa-
tions in which they find themselves; and they 
suggest that with bet ter management , they might 
perform bet ter on the job . The question, indeed, is 
not so much one of how well they perform at 
present, bu t rather of how they might perform 
under a bet ter designed and adapted system of 
management . 
A fur ther advantage of case studies is that if they 
are good they reveal what agricultural extensión 
staff actually do. A common m y t h is that their 
main task is advising farmers and particularly 
making visits to individual farmers. Perhaps this is 
the main task of extensión in some of the richer 
countries. It is o f t en not so in Eastern Africa and 
South Asia. There is a good deal of evidence that 
much of extensión workers ' t ime is, or has been, 
taken up with regulatory funct ions, with guessing 
and report ing data, with input supply and market-
ing, with organizational routine, and with special 
projects and programmes which may or may not 
involve individual farmer visits. There are great 
contrasts bo th between and within countries in the 
balance of work and the degree of pressure on 
extensión agents. Regulatory funct ions, such as 
preventing agriculturally undesirable practices, are 
o f ten now of diminished importance. Data guessing 
and reporting, however, appear widespread and 
demanding. An agricultural instructor in Sri Lanka 
can have as many as 29 reports and returns to 
submit each month . In Kenya it is common for 
júnior agricultural staff to spend f rom one to three 
days each m o n t h compiling reports. Various forms 
of organizational rout ine also take up time. For 
change agents generally in Tamil Nadu, Mencher 
has expressed her opinion that 'if a lower change 
a g e n t . . . wants to spend much time helping 
people, he must do it mostly in his spare time 
because over 80 per cent of his t ime will be speñt 
in at tending to bureaucrat ic concerns' (1970: 
1196). On top of this, input supply and rationing 
have become a major activity in some countries. 
YVherever fertilizer and agroTchemical scarcity is 
mediáted through extensión workers, it can be 
expected to absorb much of the time, not least 
because of the opportunit ies provided for pe t ty 
corrupt ion to supplement the extensión workers ' 
real incomes as these diminish rapidly with in-
flation. 
After all these other activities ana demands, advi-
sory work is liable to be a residual, and a minor 
one at that. My own impressions confirm that 
much more time is spent on rout ine and much less 
on advisory work than is believed in the manage-
ment myths of extensión. To take but one 
example, in Nor th Arcot District in Tamil Nadu 
the official f iction is that a grama sevak (extensión 
worker) should visit each village for which he is 
responsible two or three times a mon th and that he 
should be 'guide, philosopher and fr iend ' to the 
farmers. But according to investigators who main-
tained contact with 11 villages over a full agricul-
tural year (1973/74) five of them were not once 
visited by a grama sevak during that period. 
Funct ions and stages 
The si tuation requires planning and management. 
The planning relates to choices of what extensión 
staff should do. The management relates to how 
they should be induced to do it. Both o f t en go 
largely by default . 
The planning choices of what agricultural exten-
sión staff should do, if fully examined, are exceed-
ingly complex. In practice they have to be simpli-
fied. It is helpful here to begin by seeing how the 
tasks of extensión change over t ime as develop-
ment takes place. At first, in the earlier stages, 
their funct ions tend to be regulatory for farmers in 
general and advisory only for a small group of 
'progressive' farmers. Credit is of ten identified as a 
constraint and administered by them, leading them 
into a debt-collecting role. In these earlier stages of 
entry into a cash economy it may be impor tan t for 
extensión staff to collect data on acreages planted 
and progress made. Those higher up and respons-
ible for crop campaigns need rapid feedback on 
progress and staff themselves are forced by data 
collection into contact with those who are growing 
the new crops and whom they should be advising. 
The work load is usually realistic and manageable. 
Later, however, the work load gets out of hand. 
New programmes and priorities flow out f rom 
headquarters and bury the oíd which are rarely 
formally abandoned. As special programmes and 
projects multiply, the extensión agent, faced with 
the impossibility of doing everything that is re-
quired of him, adopts the sensible strategy of 
concentrat ing on whatever appears most visible, 
unavoidable and likely to be inspected, in the hope 
that in this way he can at least avoid getting into 
trouble, even if he cannot expect any positive 
reward. He cannot possibly know the acreage 
under the many different crops bu t he is con-
f ronted with not just a cont inuing but an ex-
panding demand for informat ion f rom his seniors. 
So he invents data. As the suspicion grows that all 
is not as it should be, targets are set f rom above to 
try to ensure harder work, and in consequence the 
data reported become inflated and exaggerated by 
field staff in order to show that they have achieved 
or exceeded the targets that were demanded of 
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them. As the informat ion filtering up through the 
extensión hierarchy becomes unreliable, another 
organization is created or adapted in order to 
obtain more accurate informat ion, bu t wi thout 
abandoning the demand through extensión. Two 
streams of conflicting data then flow upwards to 
myst i fy and confound the nlanners. Meanwhile, 
overloaded with the numbers of projects and pro-
grammes, each of which has its own inescapable 
paperwork, the extensión worker becomes in-
creasingly office-bound. A new food drive, or a 
new young farmers ' programme, requires even 
more reports than before and perversely ties him 
even more to the office, reducing even fur ther his 
now tenuous contacts with actual farming. But 
under personal financial pressure he claims full 
travel allowances on the basis of a diary falsified 
for the sake of the auditors and a fictitious 
monthly return of days and nights out . In fact he 
cannot of ten leave his headquarters. The remoter 
villages and the smaller farmers get no advice, and 
no services unless they come and bang on his desk. 
Principies for planning choices 
This may verge on caricature. But I think it is t rue 
enough of ten enough to provide a background for 
discussing the principies which should apply to the 
planning choices of what agricultural extensión 
staff should do. Four can be proposed.1 
The first and basic planning principie is that 
choices between alternative activities should be 
identified and should then be taken. The time and 
energy of extensión staff at the lowest levels tend 
to be regarded as infinitely elastic; in fact they are, 
and should be treated as, finite and scarce. For 
example, a s tudy of a district-level extensión plan 
1 This is a particular instance of a general phenomenon. For an 
exposure in greater breadth, see Hunter , 1974. 
in Kenya, when broken down to location (sub-sub-
district) -level, was found to make demands on ex-
tensión staff time, over a year, which varied f rom 
474 per cent of that available in the peak mon th to 
only 18 per cent in the slackest month (Belshaw 
and Chambers, 1971, appendix D). It is bet ter tha t 
staff should be expected to do less and actually do 
it and do it well, than that they should be so over-
burdened that they do nothing properly. Bold 
economizing decisions are needed to cut out some 
activities and to concéntra te on a narrower band of 
action. Later decisions to add another activity 
should be accompanied by compensating decisions 
to abandon an equally demanding activity. 
The second principie is that of compatibil i ty, and 
can be applied to selecting the narrower bank of 
activity. Four main categories of activities of ex-
tensión (apart f r o m bureaucrat ic rout ine and 
special programmes and projects) and some of their 
implications can be presented diagrammatically: 
This is obviously simplistic. The incompatibilities 
are less absolute than they may appear here. Regu-
latory and debt collecting funct ions induce a re-
lationship with farmers which is widely believed to 
impede an advisory role; and there may o f t en be 
conflicts between on the one hand input supply 
and rationing, requiring regular a t tendance at head-
quarters, and on the other advisory and research 
work which may require more travel. However, 
each situation is special and some incompatibilities, 
as in the highly different iated agricultural adminis-
trat ion of Tamil Nadu, can be handled through 
staff specialization. In general, it is bet ter to apply 
the principie of compatibil i ty case by case, with 
special reference first to the relationship with 
farmers, and second to the travel requirements, 
than to try to generalize f rom it for all circum-
stances. 
A third principie is that agricultural extensión 
functions the extensión 
worker resembles 
style of 
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should not do what other organizations can or 
should do as well or bet ter or cheaper. Much data 
collection (besides being largely useless) can be 
eliminated on the grounds that government statis-
tical departments should o f ten to able to do it 
better, if they do no t do it already. Input supply 
and rationing may be eliminated by handing them 
over to co-operatives or to the private sector 
( though extensión may remain a spearhead for in-
troducing, for example, new seeds if no other 
organization will do this). Again, each set of 
circumstances is special. 
A four th principie, though obvious, is more diffi-
cult to accept. It is that the tasks given to exten-
sión staff should be limited to what they are cap-
able of doing. To be sure, there is of ten a case for 
management reform, for management training and 
for recruiting higher calibre staff. But in the raean-
time what is given to the staff to do should be 
within their capabilities and those of their organi-
zations. One should therefore be careful in advo-
cating, for example, wholesale adaptive research 
with a high degree of devolution to the lowest 
levels, however desirable tha t may appear and even 
be as a long-term objective, if the calibre of staff 
and the hierarchical communicat ion and decisión 
system within which they operate make it unlikely 
to succeed. It follows f rom this that for organi-
zations and staff who are competen t at rout ine bu t 
poor at imaginative innovation and adaptat ion, 
programmes should be devised that are routine. 
Tasks and techniques 
Even if these four general principies are applied, 
the choice of activities for agricultural staff must 
always depend heavily on local technical, 
economic, social and political conditions and 
priorities. In current debate, however, two foci 
stand out and will be considered in turn. 
The first is the advisory funct ion, associated with 
local-level research and encouraging the adopt ion 
of new crops, seeds and practices. There is wide 
agreement here tha t well-organized demonstrat ions 
are among the most effective means of spreading 
good new practices, and that more research, some-
times described as adaptive research, should be 
carried out in field conditions. 
,The second focus is the desire to reach the smaller 
and less-well-off farmers. This is much less well 
articulated in practice than the more general advi-
sory objective, and much less energetically 
pursued. 
The difficulties of the first advisory-cum-research 
funct ion can be illustrated by the observation of 
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M.S. Swaminathan seven years ago that : 
"The field extensión staff , by and large, have been 
unable to win the respect of farmers, because of 
their poor technical and practical knowledge. They 
have, therefore, relied heavily on their control over 
input supply to invite visits f r o m farmers. The lack 
of living contact with plants and an understanding 
of the factors limiting crop yields in the farmers ' 
fields have rendered extensión staff practically use-
less f rom the point of view of t ransmit t ing to the 
scientist problems requiring investigation . . . " 
(1967:568) . 
The failure to communicate upwards to the re-
search scientists is a two-sided affair, and one 
answer is that the research scientists should them-
selves get ou t into the field more of ten . But 
another answer, which can be illustrated f r o m Sri 
Lanka, is t ha t a rout ine procedural approach 
should be 'adopted (as it is also in India and 
elsewhere), in which the extensión staff are given 
tasks which are within their capabilities and 
through which the farmers gain quick and convinc-
ing experience of new crops and practices. 
The very wide diffusion of paddy HYVs in Sri 
Lanka can partly be a t t r ibuted to the fact that 
they have of ten been highly beneficial innovations 
for farmers according to farmers ' own criteria. But 
recently a major additional factor in the speed of 
diffusion appears also to have been the system, 
sophisticated in its simplicity, of extensión field 
triáis, minikits and product ion kits which have 
been used there (Abeyratne, 1973:8-11). These are 
used on farmers ' fields under the supervisión of 
field extensión staff . The extensión field triáis 
usually involve five of the best strains of paddy. 
These are grown in a farmer 's fields under two 
dif ferent levels of fertilizer. Abeyratne has wri t ten: 
"We insist that every Agricultural Inst ructor must 
personally set down these 'Extensión Field Triáis'. 
It has been a mat ter of debate as to why extensión 
personnel should be involved in carrying out triáis. 
The Extensión Worker in contact with the farmer 
should himself be convinced of the performance of 
and must accept a new variety and its associated 
management practices . . . before he can convince 
farmers to do so. Our experience has been that 
getting the Inst ructor to lay ou t these triáis no t 
only keeps him in contact with problems of cul-
tivation bu t also involves him directly in the 
programme and sets up a dialogue between him 
and the research staff on the one hand and with 
the farmer on the o the r . " 
The minikits which follow the extensión field triáis 
consist of the seed of four to five varieties together 
with fertilizers and agrochemicals. These are very 
widely distributed free of charge. to farmers. 
Finally, production kits are sold; these contain 
seed and fertilizer to enable farmers to bulk buy 
seed for future planting for themselves and for 
others. 
This approach to paddy extensión in Sri Lanka has 
had the advantage of being limited to one crop and 
has thus been analogous to the rather simple 
extensión campaigns of one-crop organizations. 
But it has incorporated a number of sensible ideas: 
it involves a physical package which an extensión 
worker has to do something with; the outcome can 
be inspected (at least in the case of the extensión 
field triáis); farmers can directly compare different 
varieties and treatments; the extensión worker is 
offering something free (at least in theory) to the 
farmer; and farmers themselves learn f rom ex-
perience without all the information being blunted 
or distorted by passing through the extensión 
research network. 
This is an example of a sensible and practical 
approach to diffusion. It may be possible to raove 
towards greater discretion at the lower levels of 
field staff as experience is gained. For more sophis-
ticated research at the local level to be effective, 
perhaps involving several crops, two conditions 
may of ten be needed: more highly trained and 
technically competent s taff ; and a less authori-
tarian, deferential and hierarchical style of inter-
action within extensión organizations. The 'crisis 
of t rus t ' which R.N. Haldipur sees in contemporary 
Indian administration (1972:112) applies not least 
at the lowest levels, and not only in India. To 
enable divergent and discordant information to 
pass upwards through an authoritarian hierarchy a 
change of style is required. Partly this may be 
induced through the introduction of new manage-
ment procedures; partly through training; partly 
through increasingly technical and professional 
levels of discourse. But any such changes can only 
be in the longer term. 
The second focus, reaching the poorer and smaller 
farmers, is much harder to achieve. Extensión 
workers are notoriously locked into relationships 
with the larger farmers. At an organizational level, 
there may quite of ten be opportunities to use the 
older and less well trained extensión staff (who so 
of ten are overtaken by the more progressive far-
mers) for special programmes for the more 
backward farmers, while the progressives' needs are 
catered for by new specialists and by a more highly 
differentiated prívate sector. Whether this is so or 
not, management procedures may be particularly 
üseful here. It is possible to build up a repertoire of 
techniques and programmes for gettíng through to 
the smaller and poorer farmers.2 Work planning, 
self-setting of targets, and careful supervisión 
combined with specially designed procedures may 
together be able to create situations in which it 
becomes as rational for an extensión worker to pay 
at tent ion to the poorer and smaller farmers as it is 
rational today for him not to do so. But to achieve 
such a result requires much more research and 
development work on the lower levels of 
agricultural extensión. It also requires that the 
results of such research and development work 
should be made widely available. Moreover, no 
widespread campaign to reach smaller farmers can 
be expected to succeed unless it is supported by a 
convinced, credible and consistent political will. 
For only with political support can an extensión 
worker be expected to withdraw his services f rom 
those who are better off , more powerful, and more 
able to reward or penalize him, and to concéntrate 
them instead on those who are relatively disad-
vantaged. 
Obviously these are only two possible fu ture 
priority functions for agricultural extensión staff. 
In the next few years there will be others, in-
cluding the demonstration of more sophisticated 
and sparing methods of fertilizer applications and 
of water management. But whatever they are, it 
will be desirable that extensión staff can be in-
duced to do what is wanted. At one level, this can 
be tackled through the types of prescription which 
have been thrown out in the preceding paragraphs, 
suggesting particular procedures and techniques. 
But at a more general level, the problem can bet ter 
be regarded as one of management ín a wider sense, 
encompassing not just procedures, but also the 
whole range of aspects of organizations and 
motivations which influence staff performance. 
The underlying priority is for a management 
approach to agricultural extensión. 
Managing the exploitation of 
communal natural resources 
If agricultural extensión has of ten been mis-
perceived, social scientists have barely perceived at 
all the management of those who manage com-
munal resources, There are studies of departments 
of agriculture and of departments of community 
development, and of their activities; but I do not 
know (though they must surely exist) of any study 
in a Third World country of a department of soil 
conservation, forestry, wildlife, fisheries, range 
management or irrigation. 
Many reasons can be suggested for this neglect. 
Agricultural development and small farmers have 
2 For a preliminary listing see Charnbers, 1974 :82 . For an 
interesting and valuable report on an exper iment in t rying to reach 
farmers who had not adopted certain innovations, see Ascro f t , 
Roling, Kariuki and Chege, 1973. 
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rightly occupied the centre of the stage in many 
countries, and the problems of innovation 
adopt ion, input supply and marketing have rightly 
been seen as immediate priorities. Conservation 
and natural resource utilization appear to be con-
cerns of the earlier and later stages of development 
and less of the middle. The neglect is in some 
countries partly a hangover f rom an earlier 
experience. In tropical Africa for example the 
conservation of natural resources has been linked 
in the minds of people and political leaders with 
the much resented and o f t en excessive restrictions 
of colonial rule: the soil conservation and terracing 
campaigns, the policing of forest boundaries to 
keep out cattle, the prohibi t ion on cultivating the 
fertile strips beside streams, the protect ion of wild 
animals which were a public menace, and the fixed 
rotat ions of grazing control . In South Asia the rigid 
enforcement of water t imetables and issues on 
irrigation projects during the earlier, colonial 
period, provides a parallel. Again, these depart-
ments of fer returns only in the longer term (a 
gradual improvement in water supply as the forest 
regenerates, or t imber in twenty years, or fish in 
five) or even lower returns (no more crops on steep 
slopes, the closing of areas to grazing, the exclusión 
of domestic stock f rom a nature reserve) compared 
with the quicker returns to agriculture. Moreover, 
the depar tments concerned with communal re-
source management are low in the scale of political 
and depar tmental status and of ten rather low in 
their financial and research allocations. They have 
no powerful political lobby: they represent no one 
but themselves in the politics of a country, and are 
o f ten at loggerheads with those consti tuents they 
do have (forest dwellers or squatters, fishermen, 
hunters, pastoralists, irrigators). Their work, too, is 
usually split into separate areas (forests, lakes, 
game reserves, pastoral ranges, irrigation networks) , 
in contrast with those more prestigious and power-
ful depar tments which have a representative at 
every level of administrat ion in every part of the 
country. Finally, their work appears not only 
routine bu t regulatory. This makes them rather 
unattractive subjects of s tudy for social scientists, 
condit ioned as they are to valué consultation and 
popular part icipation rather than enforcement . 
That this neglect of the management of those who 
manage communal resources is serious may need 
less argument than it might have done a few years 
ago before the environment became fashionable; 
before there was a heightened awareness of our 
isolation on spaceship earth with its finite re-
sources; before populat ion began once again press-
ing hard on food supplies. Communal resource 
management is most crucially impor tan t where a 
change to lower levels of productive potential is 
irreversible except with vast capital investment or 
in geological time. Soil erosion is the main 
example, a subject which provokes extremes of 
either missionary passion or perverse blindness. But 
the neglect of communal resource management is 
also serious when the changes, though not irrevers-
ible, reduce shorter-term productivi ty — the re-
placement of watershed forests with shifting culti-
vation, the over-exploitation of fisheries, the de-
gradation of grazing lands, the lowering of water 
tables, the waste of scarce water in irrigation 
systems. These physical and biological dangers and 
losses are exacerbated at the human and organi-
zational level because of the tendency for ha rmfu l 
practices to be adopted precisely when and because 
there is pressure on resources. This makes it 
politically and administratively much more diffi-
cult to deal with them. It also makes the manage-
ment of the men who have to deal with them a 
much more impor tan t subject for study and ex-
ploration than it has been considered, and one 
which can be expected to become even more 
impor tan t in the fu ture . 
The priority of this concern is also supported by 
the positive view of the situation. Negatively there 
are resources to be protected and used carefully 
and sparingly. But positively, with the exception of 
soil tha t is eroded, the processes concerned relate 
to renewable resources, the product ion or pro-
ductivity of which can be enhanced through bet ter 
management . Tropical forests and fisheries have a 
product ion potential tha t does no t need to be 
emphasized. And to take two other specific ex-
amples, the productivity of the grazing areas of 
Botswana might be drastically increased if systems 
of short-duration grazing could be fur ther 
developed and implemented (Chambers and Feld-
man, 1973) and the productivi ty of water in the 
Dry Zone of Sri Lanka on major irrigation systems 
could be sharply raised through improved water 
management (Chambers, 1974). The management 
of communal resources presents many opportuni-
ties. 
Managing the family game 
Both the problems and the opportuni t ies are 
mediated through people; the families and com-
munities which depend on and exploit the re-
sources, and the staff of the government depart-
ments who protect these resources and regúlate 
their exploitat ion. There is much to be learned 
about the interaction of these two groups and 
about the techniques which can be used for relat-
ing them to one another. With policy choices, there 
is a strictly technical aspect in each case; bu t it has 
to be borne in mind that there is always also a 
management aspect, referring to the management 
of people, bo th people in organizations and people 
in communities. Moi-e is usually known about the 
technical than about the human aspects, suggesting 
that it is up to the social scientists now to catch up 
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with their colleagues in the natural sciences and to 
learn more about the approaches which are poss-
ible on the human side. 
At this point we need to see the nature of the 
game. We can distinguish four .nain interests: first, 
the national interest in the sustained and improved 
exploitat ion of resources, which needs no elabora-
t ion; second, the interest of the government de-
par tment responsible for control and allocation of 
the communal resources and of its s taff ; third, the 
common interest of the communi ty , however 
defined, which exploits the resource; and four th , 
the interests of individual user families. The central 
problem alises because of a conflict of interest 
between the last two, that is, between the common 
interests of the communi ty and the interest of the 
individual family. For the common interest is in 
managed and controlled exploitat ion, but the 
individual family interest, unless there are powerful 
social or administrative controls, is to play a highly 
competit ive and destructive game against other 
families or groups of families, and it is the progress 
of this game, played rationally and played hard, 
which consumes, degrades and destroys the re-
sources. 
When there is no effective control , sanction or 
collective restraint, then it is rational for the family 
to compete ruthlessly for the resource. In the case 
of common grazing, as Widstrand has said for a 
pastoral people in Kenya, " . . . rights in cattle are 
individual, bu t at the same t ime access to grazing is 
completely free . . . No individual has any incentive 
to reduce his herd as he is only going to suffer 
relative to the rest" (1973:52) . Every cattle owner 
tries to increase his herd because every other cattle 
owner is trying to increase his herd. And in the end 
everyone loses because the carrying capacity of the 
pasture diminishes. All, in the end, are worse off 
than if there had been an enforced system of 
l imitation, ex.cept perhaps for a very few who for a 
time may improve their relative position. The same 
is true when uncontrol led fishing decimates a fish 
populat ion in a lake, or when the destruction of 
forest dries up water supplies, or when anarchy on 
an irrigation system leads to the collapse of organi-
zed society. In each case it is because there are no 
socially or administratively enforced restraints, or 
because they are no t adequately enforced, that the 
competit ive family game is rational. Conversely, 
when there are socially or administratively 
enforced restraints, it becomes rational, for 
example, for all families to use wide gauge fishing 
nets, to limit their catches of fish, to abstain f rom 
destroying the forest, to limit the number of cattle 
and follow the grazing rotat ion, or to accept a 
system for allocating scarce irrigation water. 
Participation versus enforcement 
The most palatable prescription for handling these 
problems is an approach through participation and 
education. If people only understand where their 
common interest lies, then, it may be argued, they 
will collaborate. If they particípate in making 
decisions about the use of communal resources, 
then they will also be more likely to bring social 
pressures and sanctions to bear against those who 
infringe decisions. 
This approach may be feasible with small 
communit ies which have exclusive access to and 
control of the resource. Small-scale irrigation 
systems where one village has one tank (as with the 
typical pavana village of the Sri Lanka Dry Zone) 
can be operated in a very sophisticated and even 
equitable manner by the communi ty . Similarly, 
with grazing, where a small group of herders has 
exclusive control over an area and where they all 
know one another , they may be able together to 
decide on grazing rotat ions (as with some 
traditional Masai grazing in Kenya). In such 
circumstances, social sanctions against those who 
infringe decisions which have been taken in some 
traditional manner may be very powerfu l 
disincentives. But such forms of communi ty 
control are very vulnerable to two influences. 
In the first place, they can be des t royed by 
trespass, poaching or appropriat ion f rom outside 
the group. If, for example, the dry season reserve 
of a group of pastoralists is being grazed by other 
people's cattle, they may themselves move in to get 
what they can while they can. If f ishermen from 
fur ther along the shore of a lake expand their area 
of fishing using smaller gauge nets, then o ther 
fishermen will follow suit. In these cases, the 
exclusiveness of access to the resource is lost. What 
is required is some external protect ion for the 
group to penalize and restrain its competi tors . 
In the second place, these forms of communi ty 
discipline and restraint become increasingly 
difficult to initiate or maintain as the size of the 
management unit and the number of participants 
increases. There appears to be an inverse 
relationship between the ability of a communi ty to 
manage its common resources on its own and the 
number of members of that communi ty . 
Interestingly, in Sri Lanka, the distinction between 
minor and major irrigation is precisely the 
distinction between irrigation which is small 
enough for a communi ty to manage on its own, 
and irrigation which is on a scale which requires 
bureaucratic intervention. Even where there is 
bureaucratic intervention, a face-to-face 
communi ty or group may still be able to manage 
allocations and rationing among itself; but the 
allocation which it receives is administered by an 
external organization. 
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Even where management units are large, a measure 
of participation by users in the major decisions 
may still be possible. On large range management 
projects and on larger-scale irrigation, the big 
decisions — about timings of resource use, about 
allocations to groups or to families — may be taken 
in some form of public meeting, or meeting of 
representatives. Various grazing committees or 
range management committees in Eastern Africa, 
and the water meetings of Sri Lanka are examples. 
But once the decisions have been taken, their 
enforcement is beyond the power of the meeting 
or of the community. An organization is needed. 
Against the background of this discussion we can 
now see what functions organizations for the 
management of communal resources have to carry 
out. They have to protect , to control, to supervise 
and sometimes to allocate and supply resources. It 
is no coincidence that we find Forest and Game 
Wardens, Grazing and Water Guarcls. Their work, 
even though of ten in the common interest, is 
bound to be unpopular some of the time with 
some of the people, and sometimes most of the 
time with most of them. Such officials of ten have 
to prevent people f rom doing what they want to 
do; they of ten have to see that they have less of 
something than they would like. However much 
participation there may be, however much 
education, the irreducible fact is that if they do 
their work well in the national and common 
interest they will be subject to local pressures, 
particularly f rom those who are more influential, 
for special concessions; and such concessions, if 
widespread, destroy the rationale and valué of their 
work. 
Implications 
The implications are twofold. In the first place, the 
recruitment, training, organization and style of 
such organizations must be such that the staff at 
the lower levels will ratioi^ally decide to resist 
those pressures. This implies that they will be more 
concerned with the rewards and sanctions within 
the organization than those which derive some 
degree of detachment f rom, and independence of, 
the local political and social situation; that there 
must be cióse supervisión and discipline within the 
organization; that there must be a well-established 
tradition that júnior staff who do unpopular things 
according to instructions which are in the common 
interest are supported and rewarded by their 
seniors. In addition, because of the nature of the 
work and the strategies of those who try to poach 
forest land, fish, game, grazing or water, the staff 
must be mobile, prepared to work at night, and 
prepared too for the possibility of physical danger. 
What is required, in short, is something like a 
quasi-police or quasi-military organization. 
The second implication is that the staff in the 
organization must have high-level and consistent 
political support in their difficult and sometimes 
unpopular work. The frequent flabbiness of 
irrigation and grazing control organizations is not 
entirely their own fault. There is no incentive for a 
water guard to refuse to issue additional water to 
an influential farmer who demands it out of turn if 
that farmer can threaten his career through a 
political network. It makes sense for júnior staff in 
these organizations to carry out their unpopular 
duties only if they are rewarded and not penalized 
for so doing; and often that is a matter determined 
at a political level. Political education, will and 
discipline may of ten be a precondition for the 
effective operation of organizations for managing 
communal resources. 
Conclusión 
Two basic related principies underlie this 
discussion. The first is that the type, style, and 
procedure of an organization should be 
appropriate to its tasks. A highly authoritarian and 
hierarchical organization is inappropriate for 
agricultural extensión where this is meant to be 
adaptive, innovative and advisory. A relaxed and 
permissive organization is inappopriate for policing 
functions or for rationing the supply of resources 
such as water between individuáis and groups. The 
current priorities in many places may well be for 
the agricultural extensión organizations to develop 
freer communication between levels, to become 
more research-oriented and at the same time to 
become more manipulable, for example in reaching 
new target groups of the poorer farmers; and for 
organizations which manage and allocate access to 
communal resources to tighten up, to become 
more disciplined in style and more predictable and 
reliable in performance. 
The second is that a management approach must 
concéntrate on making it rational for staff in those 
organizations to do what is required of them. If 
adaptive research is desired, then more discretion 
has to be devolved and local initiative rewarded, 
including the reporting of informat ion that is true 
but discordant. If more strictly enforced rotations 
of grazing or issues of irrigation water are required, 
then the system of supex-vision, rewards and 
sanctions within the organization and between the 
organization and its environment must be so 
arranged and operated that it is rational for staff to 
do what is bound to be unpopular with their public 
client group. 
The changes required for more effective field 
administration are not easy to achieve. They are 
made more difficult by having to start from a base 
of ignorance of appropriate management practices. 
One strategy is: 
(a) setting aside a few areas for experimental 
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t rea tment . The Kenya Government ' s Special 
Rural Development Programme,3 which was 
explicitly experimental in purpose, and the 
Agrarian Research and Training Inst i tute, 
Colombo's field laboratory at Beminiwatte, 
may be impor tan t proto types and sources of 
experience here for the design of experimental 
si tuations; 
(b) encouraging management experiments. Social 
scientists, management consultants, and the 
staff of insti tutions which train for the public 
service can be encouraged to make selective 
use of whatever seems potentially valuable in 
the l i terature on management , 4 and to devise, 
test, evalúate and where appropriate replícate 
new approaches and techniques in the 
experimental situations; 
(c) diffusing the experience. At a local or national 
level, the staff who gain experience of a new 
system in the experimental si tuation may 
themselves be good trainers of others as the 
system is spread. 
This leads into the final point . A continuing 
priority is the collation and exchange of experience 
not just within bu t also between countries and 
regions. As new activities become prominent — as 
perhaps with adaptive research, with reaching the 
smaller, poorer farmers, with managing communal 
resources — there is a danger that excellent ideas 
will be known and used only locally. The need is 
for repertoires of techniques to be collected and 
built up and to be internationally available to all 
who can use them. Impressive international 
3 For accounts of which see Heyer , Ireri and Moris, 1971; Nellis, 
1972; IDS, 1972; Charnbers, 1974 and Leach, 1974. 
4 There is a p rob lem of knowing what to select f r o m an extensive, 
mainly business management , l i terature. As good a start ing poin t as 
any may be some of the writings on Management by Objectives 
(MBO), for which see Garre t t and Walker; 1969, Humble , 1969, and 
Reddin , 1971. 
institutions have been set up to develop crops: the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Centre (C'IMMYT); the International Rice Research 
Insti tute ( IRRI) ; the International Insti tute for 
Tropical Africa (UTA); the International Crops 
Research Inst i tute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT); the Internat ional Potato Centre (CIP); 
and the Internat ional Centre for Tropical Agricul-
ture (CIAT). These organizations collect genetic 
material f rom the field in many countries, crop by 
crop, build up germ plasm banks, and develop and 
diffuse new higher-yielding varieties. But where are 
the impressive international institutions set up to 
collect management techniques f rom the field in 
many countries, task by task, to build up 
repertoires of procedures, and to develop and 
diffuse higher-yielding varieties of management? 
And if any insti tutions come to mind, why do they 
in fact not do this, or not do it more, or more 
effectively? The fact seems to be that management 
in field administration is undeveloped and little 
explored — a frontier . It is t ime that it was more 
extensively, more energetically and more system-
atically opened up. 
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